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SEARCH, SEIZURE, AND OBSCENITY-CONFUSION IN
THE TEST FOR PROBABLE CAUSE
United States v. Peisner
311 F2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962)
Defendants were convicted in the United States district court for trans-
porting obscene books in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or
distribution.' The court of appeals reversed, holding that no probable cause
existed for the crucial search of defendants' automobile by the New Jersey
state policeman, and that the books found thereby were improperly ad-
mitted.2 The court's opinion reprehends such searches for obscene material
except where a qualified individual, aware of the Roth test for obscenity,3
makes a prior determination that the publications to be seized are obscene.
The decision rests upon an interpretation of the "reasonable and warrant
1 The lower court's opinion was not reported. In United States v. Peisner, 198 F.
Supp. 67 (D. Md. 1961) the lower court overruled defendants' pretrial motion to sup-
press the evidence. Defendants were convicted of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1955)
which provides in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the purpose
of sale or distribution any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, phamphlet
• . . or any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined not
more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
When any person is convicted of a violation of this Act, the court in its judg-
ment, of conviction, may, in addition to the penalty prescribed, order the con-
fiscation and disposal of such items described therein which were found in the
possession or under the immediate control of such person at the time of his arrest.
The FBI had been watching defendant Peisner for over a year and had twice before
definitely connected him with the printing and sale of obscene materials. On this occa-
sion, the FBI possessed information from a supposedly reliable informant and had
corroborated this information by observing Peisner and the other defendant loading
packages in Peisner's car with the help of one David Lerner who had previously been
connected with Peisner in the printing and distribution of obscene material, Peisner's
traveling in the direction indicated by the informer, Peisner's stopping at a bookstore
known to have handled obscene literature, and his elusive driving.
2 United States v. Peisner, 311 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1962). The court failed to
distinguish a 1958 finding of the same court as to the probable cause requirements.
Ray v. United States, 255 F.2d 473 (4th Cir. 1958):
There is no doubt that a search warrant is not a prerequisite to a legal search
of an automobile operated upon highways. Our inquiry goes only to the existence
of a reasonable basis, founded upon the knowledge and observation of the acting
officers, and their belief that the vehicle probably was being used to transport
contraband.
3 The test is "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient
interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957). Query whether the court of
appeals wished to add the "patently offensive" requirement of Manual Enterprise Inc.
v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) to the basic Roth test.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
clauses" of the Constitution 4 and the effect that the "freedom of speech
clause" 5 may have upon them.
The specific problem before the court was whether probable cause existed
for the search and seizure, as required by the fourth amendment.6 Since the
cases of Boyd v. United States7 and Weeks v. United States8 the fourth
amendment has been interpreted to prohibit the admission of evidence
obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures, which includes those con-
ducted without probable cause.9 Although the fourth amendment requirement
of a warrant to search and seize10 a person or his effects has been dispensed
with where moving vehicles are involved, the probable cause requirement
otherwise is the same." The test followed in the four leading automobile
4 U.S. Const. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized. (Emphasis added.)
See also United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). The majority of the Court
adopted the reasonableness clause as controlling and de-emphasized the requirement
of a search warrant. Justice Frankfurter vigorously dissented urging that the warrant
clause rules with the only exceptions being those of necessity: (1) searching a moving
vehicle without a warrant because it may easily be moved out of the jurisdiction before
a search warrant may be obtained; and (2) searching the person as incident to an
arrest to protect the officer and prevent the arrestee's possible escape.
5 U.S. Const. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom
of speech .... " For a discussion of the developing constitutional standards in the area
of obscenity see Lockhart and McClure, "Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards," 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5 (1960).
6 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) is the most recent case where the
Supreme Court after a thorough review of the facts found probable cause to exist for
the issuance of a search warrant. The officer here relied solely upon the information of
a supposedly reliable informant who described the defendant, told where he would be
at a certain time, and that he would have narcotics in his possession. The Court
accentuated that purely hearsay testimony could constitute probable cause as long as
there was reasonable corroboration of the individual's appearance and where he would
be at the time stated. In Wong Sun v. United States, 83 Sup. Ct. 407 (1963) the
Supreme Court seems to have stepped back toward a more strict standard for probable
cause.
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) which applies
the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
9 Jones v. United States, supra note 6. In the area of probable cause for arrest, and
search and seizure incident thereto, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1958),
overruling the "competent trial evidence" requirement of Grau v. United States, 287
U.S. 124, 128 (1932).
1o See Broeder, "Wong Sun v. United States, A Study in Faith and Hope," 42
Neb. L. Rev. 483, 492-501 (1963) for a recent discussion of the probable cause require-
ment and the fourth amendment.
11 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
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search and seizure cases'2 was a reasonable, but non-technical belief arising
out of the circumstances known to the arresting officer that the vehicle con-
tained contraband.'3
While the Federal Bureau of Investigation might have possessed facts
in the Peisner case which constituted probable cause for arresting the defend-
ants and searching their car,'14 the search and seizure were made instead by
a state turnpike policeman acting merely upon a request submitted by the
FBI that he be on the alert for a 1954 Buick which was probably carrying
obscene books. He had received no request to stop or search the vehicle. Had
the officer been acting pursuant to a FBI request to stop and search the
vehicle, under Gambino v. United States,'5 he might have been treated as
acting in a federal capacity and the knowledge possessed by the FBI could
then be attributed to him in -determining whether probable cause existed.
The state turnpike policeman did not, however, have sufficient knowledge
to constitute probable cause.16
160 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Ray v. United States, supra
note 2.
12 See cases cited supra note 11.
13 Carroll v. United States, supra note 11, at 149:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without
a warrant are made upon probable cause arising out of circumstances known
to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by
law is subject to seizure and destruction the search and seizure are valid.
In Carroll probable cause was found to exist for the search and seizure of illegally
transported liquor by three federal prohibition agents and one state officer on the fol-
lowing sequence of facts: (1) About three months prior to the search two of the agents
were called upon by the two defendants and another man, who being unaware that the
two were agents agreed to sell them some liquor. Both agents saw the car defendants
used and got its license number. No liquor was delivered. (2) About a week later
the same two agents were patrolling a road known to be used by the prohibition violators
when they were passed by the two defendants in the same car. The agents followed the
defendants but lost them. (3) On the day in question the officers were again patrolling
the highway looking for prohibition violators; met and passed defendants, pursued them,
and stopped and searched their car. The Court also judicially noticed the fact that the
road led to Detroit which was one of the most active centers for bringing illegal liquor
into the country. Brinegar v. United States, supra note 11, involves very similar facts.
In Henry v. United States, supra note 11, probable cause was found not to exist where
federal officers stopped a car and searched and seized stolen radios while investigating a
theft of an interstate shipment of liquor and believed defendants to be handling the same
on the following facts: (1) defendant's employer's statement that defendant had been
involved in interstate shipments; and (2) observation of defendants on two different
occasions loading cartons into a car from a house in a residential district.
14 United States v. Peisner, supra note 1. The court of appeals did not believe that
the FBI had probable cause on the basis of the information before it. United States
v. Peisner, supra note 2, at 104-05.
15 279 U.S. 310 (1927). Here a state officer was specifically applying a federal law
and the Court held that he should be treated as if he were a federal officer.
16 The government improperly used Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 246 (1960) as
authority for passing the knowledge possessed by the FBI to the state officer. In ,Elkins
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The court of appeals, however, did not decide the case on the foregoing
analysis, but went on to cite Marcus v. Search Warrant,17 linking the first
amendment freedom of speech and press protection' with the fourth amend-
ment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. The doctrine of
the Marcus opinion was that where adequate safeguards are not present to
protect non-obscene material, a seizure of obscene material may be an un-
lawful restraint of freedom of speech and press. In the Marcus case, a city
police officer obtained a search warrant from a state trial court upon a sworn
statement that a wholesale distributor of books, magazines and newspapers,
and five retail newsstand operators kept obscene publications for sale. The
policeman's complaint was based upon his finding one obscene publication
at each of the establishments, but the publications were not included or
listed in the complaint. The search warrant permitted any police officer to
search and seize all obscene material found in these places. Different police
officers searched the six places and seized some 11,000 copies of 280 publica-
tions after a hasty examination. Defendants' motion to quash the evidence
at a hearing two weeks later was denied. Two months later the trial court
found only one hundred of the seized publications to be obscene and
ordered the rest returned. The United States Supreme Court reversed holding
that the Missouri procedures as applied lacked the safeguards required by
fourteenth amendment due process to assure non-obscene material the protec-
tion to which it is entitled.-9 The court of appeals in the Peisner case, failing
to recognize the factual differences between its case and the Marcus case,
made a significant extension of the first amendment in its application to
search and seizure cases.
In Peisner, all available evidence connected Peisner with the printing
and distributing only of obscene materials. The furtive character of Peisner's
activity greatly decreased the likelihood that non-obscene materials would
be seized. His activities contrast sharply with the overt, lawful business of
the Court stated that evidence obtained by state officers during a search which would
have violated the defendant's immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures under the
fourth amendment if federal officers had conducted the search, would be inadmissible in
federal court. It does not follow that Elkins is authority for imputing the knowledge
of the federal officers to the state officer who stopped the car in order to furnish him with
probable cause for his action. See Brief for Appellee. pp. 10-18, United States v. Peisner,
supra note 2.
In addition, the fact that the state officer stopped several cars believing each to be
the Peisner vehicle indicates some probability that innocent people would be harassed.
Under such a showing, the Supreme Court has held that probable cause did not exist.
Henry v. United States, supra note 11, at 101. For a more recent case on the same point
see United States v. Souther, 211 F. Supp. 848 (N.D. Tenn. 1962). Draper v. United
States, supra note 9, serves as a good comparison case for Henry on the issue of the
reliability of the informant and the chance of entrapping innocent people.
17 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
18 United States v. Peisner, supra note 2, at 102. See Lockhart and McClure's
article, supra note 5.
19 Marcus v. Search Warrant, supra note 17, at 731.
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the book distributor and retailers involved in the Marcus case. Also, in
Peisner private facilities were being used so that there was no way of deter-
mining what specific books Peisner would have with him. In Marcus, on the
other hand, the books were on the open racks where they could be purchased
and a prior determination of their "obscenity" accomplished. Finally, the
Peisner case involves a federal statute which prohibits the transportation of
obscene matter in interstate commerce for sale or distribution. This statute
has been applied several times in similar circumstances and arrests and
searches have been made upon probable cause without any prior determina-
tion of obscenity as required in Peisner.20 The court of appeals failed to
discuss or distinguish any of these cases. In Marcus, a state statute and a
state supreme court rule were involved which dealt with many types of
contraband and described the procedure for their seizure. The Supreme Court
in its opinion specifically limited itself to the facts of the Marcus case and
held that the procedures as applied failed to afford sufficient protection for
non-obscene material.
The court of appeals rationalized its extension of the Marcus case
opinion by deriving from it a requirement that any search for obscene mate-
rial must be justified by a prior determination that the specific materials
sought are obscene under the Roth test.2 ' Such a requirement is an important
addition to the normal probable cause requirement for a search, which per-
mits the searching officers to consider non-technical and incompetent evidence
in making their determination as to cause.2 2 Where the chance of obstructing
the flow of non-obscene literature is great as it was in Marcus, such a
standard appears reasonable in order to afford the public protection from
overzealous police enforcement. But where the officers act upon facts in-
dicating that there is little chance that anything but hard-core pornography
will be seized under a federal statute specifically developed to reach such
cases, as in Peisner, there is no reason for such a strict standard.23
20 United States v. Astore, 288 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925
(1961); United States v. Russo, 284 F.2d 539 (2d Cir. 1960). The probable cause
determination was not contested in these cases.
21 United States v. Peisner, supra note 2, at 105.
22 Brinegar v. United States, supra note 11, at 172:
There is a large difference between the two things to be proved (guilt and prob-
able cause) . . . and therefore a like difference between the quanta and modes of
proof to require them.
23 It is possible that the court of appeals in the Peisner case believed that obscenity
in interstate commerce was not a sufficiently great social evil to permit anything less than
the strictest possible test for unreasonable searches and seizures to be used. However, if
this was the attitude of the court of appeals and the basis for its decision, it was going
against the determinations of Congress and the Supreme Court that bard-core pornog-
raphy is a social evil to be protected against. Roth v. United States, supra note 3, at 485.
For a discussion of the constitutional standards in relation to hard-core pornography
see Lockhart and McClure's article, supra note 5, pp. 58-68.
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